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Like the rest of us, Paul’s beliefs come in degrees. Some are stronger
than others. In particular, Paul believes that Linda is a bank teller and a
political activist more strongly than he believes that she is a bank teller.
That is, his credence in the former proposition is greater than his credence
in the latter. Surely, Paul is irrational. But why?1 In this survey, I describe
a new strategy for answering such questions. It is a strategy that was first
introduced by Jim Joyce [Joyce, 1998].
The traditional strategy—the strategy that Joyce sought to replace or, at
least, supplement—is to show that such credences will lead the agent who
has them to make decisions that are guaranteed to have a bad outcome.
These are the well-known Dutch Book arguments.2 For instance, Paul’s
credences will lead him to buy a book of bets on the two propositions con-
cerning Linda that is guaranteed to lose him money. This, it is claimed,
makes him irrational. Now, the validity of this argument has been the sub-
ject of much debate. However, even if it works, it only identifies one way
in which Paul’s credences are irrational: they are poor guides to action;
from a pragmatic point of view, they are irrational. But, intuitively, there is
something irrational about these credences from a purely epistemic point
of view; they seem to exhibit a purely epistemic flaw. Even for an agent
incapable of acting on her credences—and therefore incapable of making
the bets that lead to the guaranteed loss—Paul’s credences would be irra-
tional. We will be concerned with identifying why that is so. That is, Joyce’s
strategy, which we describe here, provides a purely epistemic route to the
norms that govern credences; this route does not rely on any connection
between credence and action.
1The example is taken from [Kahneman and Tversky, 1983, 297], where Kahneman and
Tversky showed that the vast majority of subjects, when presented with information about
Linda’s enthusiasm for student politics, will form credences like Paul’s. They dub this
phenomenon the conjunction fallacy.
2These were given originally in [Ramsey, 1931] and [de Finetti, 1931]. For recent sur-
veys of the literature that has grown up around these arguments, see [Ha´jek, 2008] and
[Vineberg, 2011].
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We will begin by showing how the strategy works in the case of Paul.
Then we will show how to extend it to establish Probabilism, which is the
norm that Joyce considers in his original paper. Probabilism is one of the
core tenets of so-called Bayesian epistemology. Our next target is the other
core tenet of that view, namely, Conditionalization. We will give an ar-
gument for that norm that uses Joyce’s strategy as well: it is due to Hilary
Greaves and David Wallace [Greaves and Wallace, 2006]. After considering
how we might strengthen these arguments by weakening the assumptions
they make, we conclude by describing possible avenues for future research.
1 Why Paul is irrational
First, let:
• A = Linda is a bank teller and a political activist
• B = Linda is a bank teller
Clearly, A entails B. Next, represent Paul’s epistemic state by his credence
function cPaul. This is the function that takes each of the propositions about
which he has an opinion and returns the real number in the closed unit
interval [0, 1] that gives his credence in that proposition.3 Suppose Paul
has opinions only about A and B. Thus, cPaul is defined only on A and
B. Moreover, we have cPaul(B) < cPaul(A), since Paul believes A more
strongly than he believes B. We wish to show that cPaul is irrational.
Our argument relies on an application of standard decision theory in
epistemology. In standard decision theory, an agent is faced with a set of
options; and decision theory provides principles that rule out some of those
options as irrational. For instance, the agent might be faced with the fol-
lowing options: holiday in Delhi; holiday in Nairobi; holiday in Istanbul.
A decision principle will rule out some (possibly empty) subset of this set
of options as irrational for that agent. Different decision principles require
different ingredients. Some require only the agent’s utility function, which
takes each of the options and each of the ways the world might be and as-
signs a numerical value that measures how much the agent would value
the outcome of that option if the world were that way. Thus, the utility
function of an agent deciding on her holiday destination would measure
how much she would value going to Delhi if it is raining in Delhi; how
much she would value going to Delhi if it is sunny in Delhi; and so on. And
a decision rule that required only her utility function might rule out Delhi
as irrational for an agent for whom the utility of going to Istanbul is greater
than the utility of going to Delhi regardless of how the world turns out
3Recall: [0, 1] = {x ∈ R : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
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to be.4 Other decision principles require the agent’s utility function along
with some facts about her epistemic state. For instance, such a principle
might require her state of knowledge about the objective chances of certain
events occurring; or it might require her credences in certain propositions.
But, while the input of these decision principles may vary, the output is the
same: each rules out a subset of the options as irrational.
The argument strategy that Joyce introduced, and which we will study
in this paper, applies this simple version of decision theory in epistemology.
The idea is this: Treat the set of possible epistemic states of a particular kind
as the set of options; and apply the principles of decision theory to rule out
some of those options as irrational. To do this, of course, we will need an
epistemic utility function: that is, a function that takes each epistemic state of
the particular kind in question, and each possible way the world might be,
and returns a measure of the epistemic value that the epistemic state would
have if the world were that way. In this section and the next, the kind of
epistemic state we are interested in is the kind represented by an agent’s
credence function—we might call it her credal state. So our epistemic util-
ity function takes an agent’s credence function, together with a possible
world, and returns a measure of the epistemic goodness of that credence
function at that world. In Section 3, we will consider updating rules: these
are rules that purport to say how a rational agent updates her credences
in the light of new evidence. So, in that section, our epistemic utility func-
tion will take an agent’s updating rule, together with a possible world, and
return a measure of the epistemic goodness of adopting that rule at that
world. Having defined our epistemic utility function and identified our
decision principle, we prove a mathematical theorem that characterises the
epistemic states that are ruled out as irrational by the decision principle
when it is applied to the epistemic utility function we have defined. And
we take this to establish the norm that says an agent shouldn’t have such
an epistemic state. Thus, the argument strategy has the following general
structure:
(I) Define an epistemic utility function.
(II) Pick a principle of decision theory.
(III) Prove a mathematical theorem.
In the remainder of this section, we present the epistemic utility argument
against Paul, which has precisely this structure.
4Aficionados will note that this is a very simple version of decision theory. We will
consider the behaviour of these arguments in the presence of a more complicated version
of decision theory in Section 5.
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1.1 Stage (I): the epistemic utility function
We begin by defining the most popular measure of epistemic utility for
credence functions. It is called the Brier score. We will use this measure
throughout the main body of the paper. At this stage, I do not offer any
argument that the Brier score is the only legitimate way of measuring epis-
temic utility, nor even that it is one of the legitimate ways. That will be the
concern of Section 4, where we will strengthen the argument given in the
main body of the paper by showing that they can be run using any one of
a range of different measures of epistemic utility.
The Brier score is introduced in two stages. The idea is that the epis-
temic utility of a credence function at a world ought to be given by its
‘proximity’ to the credence function that is ‘perfect’ or ‘vindicated’ at that
world—that is, the credence function that perfectly matches whatever it is
that credence functions strive to match. Thus, we need to identify, for each
world, the ‘perfect’ or ‘vindicated’ credence function; and we need to iden-
tify the correct measure of distance from each of these credence functions
to another credence function.
(Ia) Identify the vindicated credence functions.
In the first stage, we identify, for each possible world, the ‘vindicated’
credence function at that world. This is the credence function that should
be awarded maximum epistemic utility at that world; it is the credence
function that would be the best, epistemically speaking, for an agent to
have at that world. Joyce identifies it as follows:
vw(X) :=
{
0 if X is false at w
1 if X is true at w
That is, an agent has greatest epistemic utility if she has maximal cre-
dence in truths and minimal credence in falsehoods. This, Joyce con-
tends, is the correct analogue of the thesis from traditional epistemology
that belief aims at the truth [Joyce, 1998, 577-9].
(Ib) Define the distance measure.
In the second stage, we identify a measure of the distance from a vindi-
cated credence function vw to a credence function c. Here is one candi-
date amongst many that Joyce endorses:
d(vw, c) :=∑
X
|vw(X)− c(X)|2
where the sum ranges over all the propositions X to which vw and c
assign credences. Thus, the distance between a vindicated credence
function and another credence function is the sum of the squared dif-
ferences between the credences they assign. Throughout, we assume
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that an agent has credences in only finitely many propositions. On this
assumption, the distance function d is well-defined.
Putting (Ia) and (Ib) together with the thesis that the epistemic utility of a
credence function at a possible world is its proximity to the credence func-
tion that is vindicated at that world, we have the Brier score:
B(c, w) := 1− d(vw, c) = 1−∑
X
|vw(X)− c(X)|2
1.2 Stage (II): the principle of decision theory
So we have a measure of epistemic utility. Now we need a principle that
allows us to appeal to this measure in order to rule out certain credence
functions as irrational. We will appeal to the most basic such principle. To
state it, we require some terminology: Suppose A is a set of options and U
is a utility function. If a, a′ inA, then we say that a is dominated by a′ relative
to U if U(a, w) > U(a′, w), for all worlds w.
(Dominance) Suppose that:
• a is dominated by a′ relative to U;
• a′ is not dominated by any a′′ relative to U.
Then a is irrational for an agent with utility function U.
Notice that Dominance is not stated as a choice principle. We need not
assume that an agent is making a free choice between the options in A in
order to use Dominance to evaluate a particular option as irrational. Thus,
even though it seems likely that we have no volitional control over the
credences we in fact have, our credences may nonetheless be evaluated as
irrational by appealing to Dominance.
1.3 Stage (III): the mathematical theorem
The final step in our argument brings together (I) and (II) to establish Paul’s
irrationality. We can prove that, if we apply the principle of decision theory
introduced in (II) to the epistemic utility function introduced in (I), Paul’s
credence function will belong to the set that is ruled out as irrational. This
is best seen by considering Figure 1.
This completes our account of Paul’s irrationality. In sum: Suppose
we measure epistemic utility as proximity to vindication (I). And suppose
further that the vindicated credence function assigns maximal credence to
all truths and minimal credence to all falsehoods (Ia); while the distance
between a vindicated credence function and another credence function is
given by sum of the squares of the differences between the credences they
assign (Ib). Then there is a credence function c′ that has greater epistemic
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c	  
vw1	  =	  (0,	  0)	  
B	   vw2	  =	  (0,	  1)	   vw3	  =	  (1,	  1)	  
c’	  
Figure 1: Given a credence function c that is defined only on propositions
A and B, we represent c by the ordered pair (c(A), c(B)). We note that
the greater the Euclidean distance between ordered pairs, the greater the
sum of squared differences between the corresponding credence functions,
and vice versa. Now, let w1, w2, w3 be the three possible worlds: at w1, A
and B are both false; at w2, A is false and B is true; at w3, both are true;
there is no fourth possible world at which A is true and B is false, since
A entails B. And let vwi be the credence function that is vindicated at wi.
Now, the shaded area contains precisely those credence functions c such
that c(A) ≤ c(B). It is easy to see that, for any credence function c that
lies outside that set, there is a credence function c′ that lies in that set that
lies closer to each of vw1 , vw2 , and vw3 . For any such c, we choose c
′ to
be the credence function in the shaded area that is closest to c. The dark
blue dashed lines illustrate their respective distances from vw3 , in particular,
but analogous triangles can be drawn in the case of vw1 and vw2 . And,
conversely, given a credence function c′ that lies in the shaded area, there is
no credence function c that is closer to each of vw1 , vw2 , and vw3 . This shows
that the credence functions that are not dominated are precisely those that
lie in the shaded area. Thus, it is irrational to have a credence function c
such that c(A) > c(B). In particular, cPaul is irrational.
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utility than cPaul at every possible world; but there is no credence function
c′′ that has greater epistemic utility than c′ at every possible world. There-
fore, by Dominance (II), Paul is irrational.
2 Probabilism
Together, (I) and (II) above establish the following norm that governs cre-
dences:
(No Drop) Suppose X entails Y. And suppose our agent’s cre-
dence function c is defined on X and Y only. Then our agent’s
credence function is irrational if c(Y) < c(X).
Moreover, we can see that, if X entails Y, then no stronger norm governing
an agent with credences only in X and Y can be established by these means.
Any stronger norm would have to rule out further credence functions; but
we saw above that Dominance does not sanction this—no credence func-
tion that satisfies No Drop is dominated. Suppose we now turn from an
agent with credences in only two propositions, one of which entails the
other, to an agent with credences in all propositions in some full finite alge-
bra.5 What, then, is the strongest norm that can be established by appealing
to the Brier score and Dominance? The answer is Probabilism. First, a defi-
nition: A credence function c is a probability function if
(Normalization)
• If X is a tautology, then c(X) = 1;
• If X is a contradiction, then c(X) = 0.
(Additivity) If X and Y are mutually exclusive, then c(X ∨ Y) = c(X) +
c(Y).
Now we can state Probabilism:
(Probabilism) An agent’s credence function is irrational if it is
not a probability function.
As the following theorem shows, Probabilism can be established using ex-
actly the same strategy as No Drop:
Theorem 1 (de Finetti) 6
(I) If c violates Probabilism, then there is c′ that satisfies Probabilism such that
B(c, w) < B(c′, w) for all worlds w.
5That is, the agent has credences in finitely many propositions, and whenever she has
credences in two propositions X and Y, she also has credences in ¬X, ¬Y, and X ∧Y.
6This theorem is due to Bruno de Finetti [de Finetti, 1974, 87-91]; its philosophical gloss
is due to Joyce.
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(II) If c satisfies Probabilism, then there is no c′ such that B(c, w) < B(c′, w) for
all worlds w.
Thus, if we measure epistemic utility by the Brier score, any agent who
violates Probabilism is dominated, while any agent who satisfies it is not.
This provides an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism. It is not yet
Joyce’s argument for Probabilism, since Joyce permits other measures of
epistemic utility besides the Brier score. We will see how to strengthen the
argument in this way in Section 4. In the meantime, we turn to another
important norm that can be justified using Joyce’s strategy.
3 Conditionalization
Probabilism tells us how rational credences at a particular time relate to one
another: a rational agent’s credence in an exclusive disjunction will be the
sum of her credences in the disjuncts, etc. Our next norm tells us (roughly)
how a rational agent’s credences at one time relate to her credences at a
later time. More precisely, it identifies the unique rational rule for updating
our credences in the light of new evidence obtained between the earlier and
later times. It is called Conditionalization.
Just as there is a pragmatic argument for Probabilism—the Dutch Book
argument—so is there one for Conditionalization—the diachronic Dutch
Book or Dutch Strategy argument [Lewis, 1999]. Again, of course, whether
or not this argument is valid, it does not help us to identify the epistemic
failing of an agent who plans to update other than by this rule. The argu-
ment we will consider, by contrast, does identify that failing.
Before we state this norm, we need to say what we mean by an updating
rule. An updating rule tells an agent how she should respond to evidence
that she might acquire. Formally, it is a function R that takes a credence
function c, a partition E (i.e., a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive
propositions), and a proposition E in that partition E , and returns a cre-
dence function R(c, E , E). Suppose our agent’s current credence function is
c; and her next piece of evidence will be given by some proposition in the
partition E . Then R(c, E , E) is the credence function that the rule demands
the agent adopt if the proposition from E that she learns is E.
For instance, suppose Paul and Linda are playing a game. Linda thinks
of a famous person and, by asking ‘yes/no’ questions, Paul tries to guess
who it is. On the basis of her answers to his previous questions, Paul is
sure Linda is thinking of Lillian Ngoyi, Steve Biko, or Mahatma Gandhi.
His next question is: Was the person born in South Africa? Thus, the parti-
tion from which he knows his evidence will come is {Ngoyi∨Biko, Gandhi}.
Thus, an updating rule must assign to each of the two members of that
partition the credence function it requires Paul to adopt if he learns that
proposition.
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We define the standard Bayesian updating rule as follows: Let Cond be
the updating rule:
Cond(c, E , E) = c(·|E) := c(· ∧ E)
c(E)
And we state the norm as follows:
(Conditionalization) All updating rules other than Cond are ir-
rational.
That is, the only updating rule that Conditionalization does not rule out as
irrational is Cond, which requires that an agent take her new credences to
be her old credences conditional on the evidence she has acquired in the
meantime.
How might we justify Conditionalization? Again, we can appeal to con-
siderations of epistemic utility. And again, our argument has two stages:
in the first, we use our epistemic utility function over credence functions to
define a function that measures the epistemic utility of an updating rule at
a world; in the second, we identify a principle of decision theory. As be-
fore, we bring together these two stages by applying the decision-theoretic
principle to the epistemic utility function for updating rules; we prove that
this rules out all updating rules except Cond as irrational. This style of
argument was first given explicitly by Hilary Greaves and David Wallace
[Greaves and Wallace, 2006].
3.1 Stage (I): the epistemic utility function
Let us continue to assume, as we did in our argument for Probabilism, that
the epistemic utility of a credence function c at world w is given by the Brier
score B(c, w) of c at w. Then we can use this to define the epistemic utility of
an updating rule R at a world w, when R is applied to a credence function
c and a partition E : it is B(R(c, E , Ew), w), where Ew is the element of E that
is true at world w. That is, given one’s current credence function and a
partition from which one’s future evidence will come, the epistemic utility
of an updating rule at a particular world is just the Brier score, at that world,
of the new credence function that the updating rule will demand if one
learns the proposition in the partition that is true at that world. Consider
our example; and consider the world at which Linda is in fact thinking of
Steve Biko. Then, for Paul, the epistemic utility of an updating rule at that
world is just the Brier score of whichever credence function that updating
rule requires of Paul when Linda answers ‘yes’ to his question and thus
provides him with the evidence Ngoyi∨ Biko.
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3.2 Stage (II): the principle of decision theory
Next, consider the following well known principle of decision theory. Again,
we need a little terminology in order to state it: Suppose A is a set of op-
tions, U is a utility function, and c is a probability function. If a in A, then
we define the expected utility of a relative to U and c as follows:
ExpU,c(a) =∑
w
c(w)U(a, w)
where w is the proposition that is true at world w and only at world w.7
(Maximize Expected Utility) Suppose that:
• ExpU,c(a) < ExpU,c(a′); and
• ExpU,c(a′′) ≤ ExpU,c(a′) for all a′′ in A.
Then a is irrational for an agent with utility function U and cre-
dence function c.
This says that, when there are options with maximal expected utility rela-
tive to one’s credence function and utility function, it is irrational to choose
any other options.
3.3 Stage (III): the mathematical theorem
As before, we now apply the decision-theoretic principle identified in (II)
to the epistemic utility function identified in (I). Together, they entail Con-
ditionalization, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 2 (Greaves and Wallace) 8 Suppose E is a partition and c is a proba-
bilistic credence function. Then, for any updating rule R 6= Cond,
∑
w
c(w)B(R(c, E , Ew), w) <∑
w
c(w)B(Cond(c, E , Ew), w)
Thus, if a probabilistic agent were to plan to update her credences by any
rule other than Cond, she would not be maximising her expected epis-
temic utility relative to her current credence function and the Brier score
for updating rules. That is, she would expect the outcome of her alterna-
tive updating rule to have less epistemic utility than she would expect the
outcome of Cond to have. This is our epistemic utility argument for Condi-
tionalization. Again, it is not quite Greaves and Wallace’s, since it assumes
that epistemic utility is measured by the Brier score. Again, in Section 4,
7One might think of w as the state description corresponding to w. It is guaranteed to
exist by the fact that the algebra on which c is defined is full and finite.
8For the proof of this theorem, see [Greaves and Wallace, 2006, 624].
10
we will describe ways to weaken this assumption and thereby strengthen
the argument.
One might worry that Conditionalization is not exactly the updating
norm endorsed by Bayesians. Conditionalization assumes that an updat-
ing rule is a function that takes as its input a credence function, a partition,
and a proposition in that partition. And one might worry that it should
take only a credence function and a proposition. After all, an agent of-
ten does not know the partition from which her evidence will come; and
even after she has acquired that evidence, she often does not know which
other propositions she might have learned. Nonetheless, Conditionaliza-
tion does entail that, for every partition E to which the proposition E be-
longs, a rational agent whose evidence will come from E will plan to adopt
the credence function c(·|E) if she learns E. Perhaps this is sufficiently close
to the norm the Bayesians endorse.
4 Other epistemic utility functions
Our epistemic utility arguments for Probabilism and Conditionalization
have relied on the assumption that there is only one way to measure epis-
temic utility, namely, the Brier score. Is this assumption justified? Can we
strengthen our arguments by weakening this assumption?
Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew argued that the Brier score is
the only legitimate measure of the epistemic utility of a credence func-
tion [Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010]; and Reinhard Selten argued that it is the
only correct measure at least in the case of probabilistic credence functions
[Selten, 1998]. But their arguments rely on strong geometrical assumptions
that have yet to be well motivated. Joyce, by contrast, is more permis-
sive. He enumerates a set of properties and claims that a function must
have at least these if it is to count as a legitimate measure of epistemic util-
ity [Joyce, 1998, Section 4]. He then shows that Theorem 1 holds for any
function that boasts the properties he lists. Thus, any legitimate epistemic
utility function can be used to justify Probabilism. Greaves and Wallace
take a similar approach [Greaves and Wallace, 2006, Section 3.1]. In fact,
the properties they endorse are of greater interest, since they constitute the
weakest known properties that suffice for analogues to Theorems 1 and 2,
the mathematical results that underpin our arguments for Probabilism and
Conditionalization. Let’s consider them briefly.
Definition 1 An epistemic utility function S is separable if, for each proposition
X, there is a function sX : {0, 1} × [0, 1]→ [0,∞] such that
S(c, w) := 1−∑
X
sX(vw(X), c(X))
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We might think of sX(1, x) as the epistemic utility of having credence x
in X at a world at which X is true, while sX(0, x) is the epistemic utility
of having credence x in X at a world at which X is false. Note that, if
sX(1, x) = |1− x|2 and sX(0, x) = |x|2, then S is the Brier score.
Definition 2 An epistemic utility function S is proper if, for any probabilistic
credence function c and credence function c′ 6= c,
∑
w
c(w)S(c′, w) <∑
w
c(w)S(c, w)
That is, S is proper if any probabilistic credence function expects itself to be
better than it expects any other credence function to be. Then:
• Predd, et al. show that Theorem 1 holds for any separable, proper epis-
temic utility function [Predd et al., 2009].
• Greaves and Wallace show that Theorem 2 holds for any proper epis-
temic utility function [Greaves and Wallace, 2006].
These are very strong results. They permit many different measures of epis-
temic utility: the Brier score, as well as the so-called logarithmic scoring
rule, the spherical scoring rule, and many others.9 Do they strengthen our
arguments for Probabilism and Conditionalization? In the case of Condi-
tionalization, they certainly do; in the case of Probabilism, we have to be a
bit careful. Let’s see why.
Suppose our agent doesn’t know what her epistemic utility function is;
or suppose that she simply does not have sufficiently determinate attitudes
to fix a unique such function. Nonetheless, she knows from some generali-
sation of Theorem 1 that whichever legitimate epistemic utility function she
has will make any non-probabilistic credence function dominated. Even so,
it doesn’t follow that any such credence function is irrational for her. Af-
ter all, she may be in the following situation, which is not ruled out by the
generalization of Theorem 1:
• S1 and S2 are legitimate epistemic utility functions by the lights of this
generalization of Theorem 1.
• c is a credence function that violates Probabilism
• For every probabilistic c1 that dominates c relative to S1, we have S2(c1, w)
S2(c, w) for some world w.
• For every probabilistic c2 that dominates c relative to S2, we have S1(c2, w)
S1(c, w) for some world w.
9See [Joyce, 2009, Section 8] for a survey of separable, proper epistemic utility functions.
12
In this situation, it would not be irrational for our agent to stick with cre-
dence function c. After all, while moving to a credence function c1 that
dominates c with respect to S1 is guaranteed to serve her better by the lights
of S1, it risks serving her very badly by the lights of S2. And recall that she
doesn’t know whether S1 or S2 reflects her epistemic values. Moreover, a
similar argument shows that it is not mandatory to move to any credence
function c2 that dominates c with respect to S2.
This objection was first raised by Aaron Bronfman in an unpublished
note on Joyce’s original paper [Bronfman, ms]. To block it, we must as-
sume that, while there are many legitimate epistemic utility functions, any
particular agent has a single determinate such function. This response al-
lows us to drop the implausible assumption that there is just one legitimate
way of valuing credences, whilst avoiding Bronfman’s objection.
Why does Bronfman’s objection not affect Greaves and Wallace’s argu-
ment for Conditionalization? The reason is that, in the argument for Condi-
tionalization, there is a single option—namely, the updating rule Cond—
that has higher expected epistemic utility than all others relative to any
proper epistemic utility function.
5 Recent and future work
This completes our survey of the two central applications of the argument
strategy that Joyce introduced in his 1998 paper. In this final section, I wish
to describe three ways in which this style of argument might develop—
indeed, in some cases, it is already developing in these ways.
5.1 Characterising epistemic utility functions
As I mentioned in Section 4, we now have very powerful mathematical
theorems that generalise Theorems 1 and 2 by showing that they hold for
any of a number of different ways of measuring epistemic utility. What we
lack are really strong philosophical arguments that every legitimate way
of measuring epistemic utility belongs to this number. In short, we need
a philosophical argument that every legitimate epistemic utility function
is both separable and proper. Joyce has proposed an argument for pro-
priety [Joyce, 2009, 279]; but Alan Ha´jek has raised a powerful objection
[Ha´jek, 2008, 814-5].
Throughout, we have agreed with Joyce that the vindicated credence
function at a world is vw. But consider an agent with credences in a set
of propositions that are governed by a non-classical logic. Then vw may
not be well defined. For instance, if there is a world at which one of the
propositions is neither true nor false, then vw is not a total function; if there
is a world at which one of the propositions is both true and false, then vw
is ill-defined. Robbie Williams has investigated how we might define the
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vindicated credence function at such a world [Williams, 2012]. And he has
drawn on mathematical results due to Jeff Paris to characterise the credence
functions that are permitted by Dominance relative to an epistemic utility
function that measures proximity to these vindicated credence functions
[Paris, 2001].
5.2 Choosing decision principles
Our argument for Probabilism depends on Dominance; our argument for
Conditionalization depends on Maximize Expected Utility. But there are
other decision principles out there. What epistemic norms do these alterna-
tive principles entail when coupled with a particular measure of epistemic
utility?
In [Pettigrew, 2013], Richard Pettigrew considers a decision principle
that (roughly) rules out as irrational any option that is expected by every
possible objective chance function to have lower utility than some other
option. Combined with any separable proper scoring rule, this principle
entails David Lewis’ Principal Principle.
Other decision principles that have had some attention are the princi-
ples of evidential and causal decision theory. These principles apply when
the ways the world might be are not taken to be independent of the options
from which the agent chooses. Michael Caie and Hilary Greaves have ex-
plored the consequences of these norms [Caie, ta], [Greaves, ms]. As Caie
shows, considerations of epistemic utility should lead us to reject Probabil-
ism for credences in certain propositions that concern a particular agent’s
credence in that proposition. These are situations in which Dominance does
not apply, because the assumption of act-state independence that we have
made throughout does not hold.
5.3 Modelling epistemic states
Finally, while we have focussed on the epistemic utility of credences, the
same argument strategy may be applied to other sorts of epistemic state,
such as full beliefs, indeterminate (or mushy) credences, and comparative
probabilities. In each case, we need only identify the legitimate measures of
epistemic utility. And, in each case, that may amount to identifying the vin-
dicated epistemic states of that sort as well as measures of distance between
such states. In the case in which both credences and full beliefs are present,
important work was done by Hempel, Levi, and Maher [Hempel, 1962],
[Levi, 1974], [Maher, 1993]. More recently, Kenny Easwaran has consid-
ered the case in which there are only full beliefs [Easwaran, ms]. In the
case of comparative probabilities, Branden Fitelson and David McCarthy
have some initial results [Fitelson and McCarthy, ms].
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6 Conclusion
In his 1998 paper, Joyce introduced an entirely novel style of argument for
epistemic norms: characterise the legitimate measures of the epistemic util-
ity of an epistemic state at a world; then apply decision principles to this
function to derive epistemic norms that govern these states. So far, we have
seen justifications for some central norms given in this way. But there are
many more to go.
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